The Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Is a General Partner of a Limited Partnership an Investment Adviser? by Zoba, C. David
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3
1979
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Is a General
Partner of a Limited Partnership an Investment
Adviser?
C. David Zoba
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
C. David Zoba, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Is a General Partner of a Limited Partnership an Investment Adviser?, 29 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 634 (1979)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol29/iss3/7
THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940: IS A
GENERAL PARTNER OF A LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AN INVESTMENT
ADVISER?
Various expressions of policy by the Securities and Exchange Commission as
well as a recent decision by the Second Circuit have created uncertainty with respect
to the applicability of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to generalpartners of
limited partnershos. While the Commission urges that the Advisers Act was
designed to cover the securities advisory activities of business firm managers not
reached by the Investment Company ,4ct of 1940, the author, after examining the
policies underlying these companion acts, constructs an analyticalframeworkfor the
application of the dnition of an investment adviser. Focusing on the nature of the
limited partnershF 's asset project, the general partner's management function, and
the methodfor compensating the general partner, the author proposes that the gen-
eralpartner be deemed an investment adviser only when he offers securities advice in
a capacity removedfrom day-to-day management activities of hisfimr.
INTRODUCTION
D ESPITE THE SIGNAL decision of the Second Circuit in Abraham-
son v. Fleschnert and numerous no-action letters2 issued by the
1. 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). In Abrahamson, the
court found that an implied private right of action existed under § 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). The case arose when two limited partners
sued the partnership, its accountants, and its general partners for failure to disclose sub-
stantial investment of partnership assets in unregistered securities. 392 F. Supp. 740, 741
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). The plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that the failure to disclose constituted
fraudulent conduct under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(1976). Id The defendants responded that they were not investment advisers within the
meaning of § 202(a)( 11) of the Act and that the plaintiffs had realized no losses compensa-
ble under the Act. Id at 743-44. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, stating that the complaint had failed to allege compensable damages.
Id at 750.
On appeal, the Second Circuit saw the inquiry presented by the Advisers Act claim as
threefold: First, were any of the general partners investment advisers under § 202(a)( 11);
second, was there an implied private right of action under § 206; and third, had the plain-
tiffs alleged compensable damages. 568 F.2d at 869.
The court of appeals held that the general partners were investment advisers since they
were "'engage[d] in the business of advising others' with respect to investments" and were
compensated for this advice. Id. at 870. The second issue-whether there was an implied
private right of action under § 206 -was one of first impression. The court concluded that
in order to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the Act it was necessary to recognize a
private right of action so that the Act's enforcement would not be left entirely to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. Id at 872. Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs' claim
for damages was not too speculative. Id at 878. For further references on this implied
private right of action, see note 17 infra.
2. An individual may receive informal advice from the staff of the SEC concerning
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staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission,3 uncertainty
persists within the investment community concerning the status of
general partners of limited partnerships as investment advisers, as
defined in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers
Act).4 This uncertainty is particularly troublesome in light of the
frequent use of the limited partnership as an investment vehicle.'
The uncertainty relates to two issues: (1) whether a general part-
ner is an investment adviser under section 202(a)(1 1) of the Advis-
ers Act;6 and (2) if so, under what circumstances will he be
required to register?
7
the interpretation of securities laws by submitting a written request to which the staff will
give a written reply indicating whether it would or would not recommend that the Com-
mission take enforcement action if the conduct described in the request occurs. The posi-
tion taken by the staff in these replies is subject to reconsideration and may not be regarded
as binding upon the SEC. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5037 (July 14, 1970), reprinted
in [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 77,838.
The term "no-action request" will be used in this Note to refer to a letter submitted to
the staff of the SEC seeking interpretation of securities laws. The term "no-action letter"
will be used to refer to the staff's response. No-action letters referred to in this Note are
cited to the Federal Securities Law Reporter (CCH), if available. Unpublished correspon-
dence will be cited by the name of the requesting party and the date on which the staffs
response was made public. These latter letters may be obtained from the SEC or by using
LEXIS.
3. E.g., John Terwilliger, SEC no-action letter (June 27, 1977); Michael Coleman &
Lawrence Grenon, SEC no-action letter (July 28, 1976); The Consartium Fund, SEC no-
action letter (Sept. 3, 1975); Hydrocarbon Resources, Ltd., SEC no-action letter (Feb. 29,
1975).
4. Section 202(a)(1 1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (1976), defines investment
adviser as follows:
"Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensation, engages in
the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings,
as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
selling securities, or who, for compensation and as a part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities; but does not in-
clude (A) a bank . . . ; (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose
performance of such services is solely incidental to the practice of his profession;
(C) any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is solely incidental
to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special
compensation therefor, (D) the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news mag-
azine or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation; (E)
any person whose advice, analyses or reports relate to no securities other than
securities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal
or interest by the United States . . . ; or (F) such other persons not within the
intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and regula-
tions or order.
5. See notes 23-24 infra and accompanying text.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (1976).
7. A person who qualifies as an investment adviser under § 202(a)(1 1) is required to
register with the SEC pursuant to § 203, id. § 80b-3, unless exempted by one of the provi-
sions of §203(b). Section 203(b) reads as follows:
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to-
(1) any investment adviser all of whose clients are residents of the State
19791
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Classification of the general partner as an investment adviser
subject to registration gives rise to a number of potentially signifi-
cant problems. One immediate problem is the basic conflict be-
tween compensation restrictions placed on registered advisers and
the normal modes of compensating general partners of limited
partnerships. Section 205(1) of the Advisers Act prohibits a regis-
tered investment adviser from basing his compensation on a per-
centage of the capital gains upon, or capital appreciation of, a
client's fundsY Because profit-sharing is a fundamental aspect of
many general partners' compensation,9 this restriction would up-
set traditional practices and expectations and eliminate one of the
underlying incentives to form limited partnerships."
The registration and reporting requirements"I of the Advisers
Act present a less significant, but nonetheless time-consuming and
burdensome problem for the general partner required to register.
Certain regulations promulgated by the SEC could be construed
to require the general partner to maintain all the designated books
and records for each individual limited partner on an ongoing ba-
sis. 12
within which such investment adviser maintains his or its principal office and
place of business, and who does not furnish advice or issue analyses or reports
with respect to securities listed or admitted to unlisted trading privileges or any
national securities exchange;
(2) any investment adviser whose only clients are insurance companies; or
(3) any investment adviser who during the course of the preceding twelve
months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds himself out gen-
erally to the public as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to
any investment company registered under subchapter I of this chapter.
For a discussion of the registration requirements and exemptions therefrom, see
Lovitch, The Investment Advisers Act of l940-fho Is an "'Investment Adviser", 24 KAN.
L. REV. 67, 69-72 (1975).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(1) (1976). The profit-sharing restrictions apply only to regis-
tered investment advisers and do not apply to persons who qualify under the definition of
"adviser" in § 202(a)(1 I) but are exempted from registration by § 203(b).
9. See Hacker & Rotunda, Sponsors ofReal Estate Partnerships as Brokers and In-
vestment Advisers, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 322, 325 & n. 13 (1975). See also REVISED UNI-
FORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 503.
10. The SEC staff has already indicated that the § 205(1) restrictions will apply to
profit-sharing compensation arrangements of general partners who are deemed investment
advisers. Capital Investment Group, Inc., SEC no-action letter (July 9, 1972); Computer
Directions Advisors, Inc., SEC no-action letter (June 4, 1972); Gardner and Preston Moss,
Inc., SEC no-action letter (Feb. 23, 1972), reprinted in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,638.
11. Advisers Act §§ 203, 204, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3, -4 (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1,
-2, -3, .204-1, -2 (1978).
12. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(b), -2(c) (1979) (adviser supervising, managing, or hav-
ing custody of securities portfolio required to keep certain records for each client).
A general partner of a venture capital limited partnership recently received an exemp-
tion from the profit-sharing provisions of § 205(1) and, in part, from the record keeping
[Vol. 29:634
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Classification as an investment adviser is significant to the gen-
eral partner even if he qualifies for an exemption from registra-
tion.' 3  General antideception liability provisions, as well as
prohibitions on specific activities, contained in section 206 of the
Advisers Act and rules promulgated thereunder apply to any per-
son deemed an adviser, regardless of whether he is exempt from
registration. 4 Any person engaged in practices that violate these
rules is subject to injunctive action by the SEC 5 and possibly to
federal criminal penalties.' 6
One additional consequence of including general partners
within the definition of investment advisers is the possibility of
their being held subject to a private cause of action for fraud
under section 206 of the Advisers Act.' 7 In an enforcement action
by the Commission in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
requirements of rule 204-2(b) and (c). In the Matter of Foster Management Company,
SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 651 (Nov. 28, 1978).
The Commission has proposed that certain registered advisers to business development
companies (venture capital firms) be permitted to be compensated on the basis of a share of
net capital gains on the funds of the business development company. Performance-Based
Compensation of Registered Investment Advisers to Business Development Companies;
Proposed Rule, SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 680 (June 19, 1979), reprinted in
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,113.
13. See note 7 supra.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or pro-
spective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to
or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than
such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the ac-
count of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the com-
pletion of such transaction of the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the
consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph shall
not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker
or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this para-
graph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
15. Advisers Act § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. 80b-9(e) (1976).
16. Id § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1976) (providing for criminal liability for willful
violations of the Advisers Act).
17. See note 1 supra. Courts have divided on the issue of an implied private right of
action under the Advisers Act. Compare Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 872-76
(2d Cir. 1977) (finding implied right of action), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) with
Greenspan v. Del Toro, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 95,488
(S.D. Fla. 1974) and Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
19791
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
Inc., 18 the Supreme Court stated, in its only express interpretation
of any provision of the Advisers Act, that section 206 "is to be
construed like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose
of avoiding frauds,' not technically and restrictively, but flexibly
to effectuate its remedial purpose."' 9 Thus, the general partner
classified as an investment adviser may be exposed to the broad
and remedial construction of the general antideception liability
provisions found in section 206.20
In sum, characterization of a general partner as an investment
adviser may expose him to more liability and place more limita-
tions upon his activities and remuneration than he has tradition-
ally bargained for. These disincentives may ultimately have an
adverse effect upon the attractiveness and viability of limited part-
nerships as investment vehicles.
After a brief description of the common characteristics of lim-
ited partnerships, this Note will attempt to extract the essential
legislative policies underlying the Advisers Act and its companion
enactment, The Investment Company Act of 1940.21 These poli-
cies will be used as a framework for analyzing the statutory defini-
tion of an investment adviser. This analysis will then be applied
to the limited partnership investment context to determine
whether a general partner may be appropriately characterized as
an investment adviser. Concluding that the general partner may
not be an investment adviser under many limited partnership ar-
rangements that are popularly employed today, the Note proposes
an analytical approach to determine those situations in which the
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,761 (S.D. Cal. 1974) (both cases finding no implied fight of ac-
tion).
This issue is currently before the Supreme Court in Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575
F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 439 U.S. 952 (1978).
For a full discussion of .4brahamson with particular attention to the private cause of
action issue, see Recent Case, 30 VAND. L. REV. 905 (1977). See also Note, Private Causes
ofAction Under Section 206 ofthe Investment Advisers Act, 74 MicH. L. REv. 308 (1975),
noted in Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d at 872 n.17.
18. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
19. Id at 195.
20. The Supreme Court in Capital Gains distinguished the § 206 antideception provi-
sions from a common law action in fraud by concluding that the Advisers Act empowered
"the courts to enjoin any practice which operates 'as a fraud or deceit' upon a client, [and
that Congress] did not intend to requireproof of intent to injure and actual injury to the cli-
ent." Id (emphasis added).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976).
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general partner's activities may be within the purview of the Ad-
visers Act.
I. THE POLICIES OF THE ADVISERS ACT WITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
A. General Description of Limited Partnerships
The analysis in this Note concludes that the proper application
of the Advisers Act definition of the investment adviser turns
upon three principal characteristics of limited partnerships: (1)
the underlying asset project of the limited partnership, that is, the
use to which investors' contributed capital is put; (2) the nature of
the management function of the general partner; and (3) the na-
ture of the compensation arrangement between the general part-
ner and the limited partnership. These characteristics vary
significantly among limited partnerships. This section will briefly
describe some of the possibilities. 22
1. Nature of the Underlying Asset Project
Limited partnerships exist for countless business objectives.23
During the last decade, limited partnerships have become increas-
ingly popular as a business form, primarily because of their poten-
tial tax benefits. 4 Of particular relevance in determining the
coverage of the Advisers Act is whether the partnership's underly-
ing asset project involves securities.25 While some partnerships,
22. For a more comprehensive account of the varying forms of limited partnership
organization, see Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 9, at 324-326.
23. The many purposes for which limited partnerships have been formed include
managing venture capital investments, e.g., Bankamerica Investment Management Corp.,
SEC no-action letter (April 27, 1978), reorinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,697; providing financial support to new businesses, e.g., Fidelity Venture As-
soc., SEC no-action letter (Dec. 21, 1977); investing in works of art, e.g., The Consartium
Fund, SEC no-action letter (Sept. 3, 1975); and effecting a corporate takeover, e.g., Hydro-
carbon Resources, Ltd., SEC no-action letter (Feb. 29, 1975).
24. See, e.g., Sperling & Lokkan, The Limited Partnershio Tax Shelter:.An Investment
Vehicle Under Attack, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1976); Van Camp, Living With Tax Shelters in
California: A Discussion of the New California Real Estate Syndication Rules, 7 U.S.F. L.
REV. 403 (1973).
The advantage of the limited partnership form is that it allows start-up costs, deprecia-
tion deductions, and other business losses to flow directly through to the limited partners,
who are thereby provided with tax items that shelter general accounting profits flowing
from the partnership as well as income received by the partners from other sources. In
addition to saving tax dollars, an investor in a limited partnership may of course benefit
from any general accounting profits earned by the partnership enterprise. See I.R.C. § 702.
25. See notes 89-106 infra and accompanying text.
1979]
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such as hedge funds, 26 are almost exclusively involved with the
buying and selling of securities, others' involvement with securi-
ties is not so apparent and depends upon a difficult factual and
legal determination of the nature of the portfolio.27
2. Nature of the General Partner's Management Function
The general partner is often the "sponsor" of a limited part-
nership.28 He will structure the partnership by preparing the nec-
essary agreements and documents, and then sell the limited
partnership interests to prospective limited partners.29 Once the
partnership is established, the general partner's function will vary,
depending on the nature of the partnership's underlying asset pro-
ject and the number of limited partnerships served by the general
partner. The general partner may assume a purely managerial
function, handling alone or with other general partners all the
business affairs of the partnership, and thereby devoting full-time,
particularized attention to the partnership. Alternatively, the gen-
eral partner may have minimal, stereotyped managerial duties in
which he does not give particularized attention to any one part-
nership. Instead, he may devote his time to the organization of
other partnerships, often with many of the same limited partners,
many of whom may invest in several partnerships simultaneously
or seriatim. 30
3. Nature of the General Partner's Compensation
Various methods may be used to compensate the general part-
ners. The type of compensation will depend in large part on the
nature of the limited partnership and the function the general
partner fulfills. Both special fees for specific services and equity
26. A hedge fund is defined as "a limited partnership in which the contributions of a
small number of limited partners are pooled and invested and reinvested by the general
partner in a portfolio of securities." Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 9, at 336.
27. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967). For example, in the real estate context, partner-
ship investment in a second partnership holding real estate has been deemed to be invest-
ment in a security. See Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 9, at 323 n.7.
28. Hacker and Rotunda observe that in the real estate tax shelter industry, corporate
general partner-"sponsors" are the norm. Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 9, at 324.
29. Id Such offerings are usually made so as to comply with the private placement
exemption from registration set out in § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (1976), and rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1979), promulgated thereunder. Id at
325-26. See also Halloran, Partnerships. Securities Law Aspects, in ALI-ABA RESOURCE
MATERIALS: PARTNERSHIPS 387, 395-401 (1977).
30. See generally Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 9, at 324-26.
[Vol. 29:634
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shares greater than proportionate capital contributions have been
used.3' Alternatively, the general partner may be paid a fixed sal-
ary solely for his services as a full-time manager of partnership
affairs or specifically for advice about investments.
B. Historical Background of the Advisers Act
An examination of the history of the Advisers Act reveals that
it was designed primarily to provide a simple form of occupa-
tional licensing for the emerging profession of independent coun-
selors. Moreover, it is evident that Congress envisaged a furnisher
of advisory services who had a pecuniary interest in the securities
performance of the advisee-firm's portfolio, where that perform-
ance was a function of the investment advice he provided, but did
not have an interest in the advisee-firm as an investor or a full-
time, salaried employee-manager. The measures adopted to elim-
inate potential conflicts of interest between adviser and client, not
adequately addressed by local business association law regulating
manager-firm relations, reflect this perspective of the adviser as
one who stands in a posture external 32 to the investor.
Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
193533 directed the SEC to conduct a study of investment trusts
and investment companies. As a supplement to its comprehensive
study of investment trusts and investment companies,34 the SEC
conducted a more cursory survey35 of the activities of "those in-
vestment counselors who are associated with investment compa-
nies.' '36  Two separate problem areas emerged from this latter
31. Id
32. The concept of "externality" is critical to the analysis in this Note and is devel-
oped in notes 72-86 infra and accompanying text. In the context of this Note, the term
implies characteristics which are in contradistinction to the qualities of a purely internal
business manager, whose position involves irrevocable discretionary management preroga-
tives invested by business association law and who receives for his full-time services com-
pensation that is undifferentiated as to his function, among other functions, as furnisher of
advice about his firm's securities.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1976).
34. The SEC's report of the study was published in four parts during the years
1938-1941. SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
COMPANIES, H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); H.R. Doc. No. 70, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R. Doc. No. 279,76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939-40); H.R. Doc. No.
136, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. Doc. No. 246, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941).
35. H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939).
36. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 51 (1940) (state-
ment of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, SEC Investment Trust Study) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings].
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survey, both of which were ultimately reflected in the Advisers
Act. The first area of concern, and the one receiving primary at-
tention during the congressional hearings on the Advisers Act,
was how to distinguish between bona fide investment counselors
and the "tipsters and touts" making up the investment counsel
fringe.37 To this end the SEC recommended, as the fundamental
objective of the Advisers Act, a compulsory census of all invest-
ment advisers.38
The second problem area involved the organization and oper-
ation of investment counsel institutions. Of major concern were
the potential abuses that could arise in the course of advising the
investor client.39 In view of the specific abuses envisaged by the
SEC and considering the type of investment adviser which it stud-
By admission of the chief counsel to the SEC Investment Trust Study, the study of
investment advisers was limited in scope, focusing on the single category of adviser associ-
ated with investment companies. Id Because the supplemental report on investment ad-
visers was an outgrowth of the Investment Trusts and Investment Companies Study, the
SEC believed its jurisdiction with respect to the scope of the investigation was limited to
gathering detailed information only from "people who acted as [external] investment man-
agers to investment companies. ... Id at 49. As a result, only 70 of the 5,335 pages of
reports submitted to Congress by the SEC in connection with the Investment Trusts and
Investment Companies Study were concerned with investment advisers and only 72 of the
1,276 pages of congressional hearings were related to the Advisers Act. Investment Trusts
and Investment Companies: Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 307 (1940) (report of
Robert E. Healy, .SEC Commissioner).
37. H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940); Senate Hearings, supra note
36, at 711-58. Both the SEC and the representatives of the investment counsel industry
who testified at hearings held by the SEC agreed that there existed an "investment counsel
fringe which includes those incompetent and unethical individuals or organizations who
represent themselves as bona fide investment counselors." H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong.,
2d Sess. 34 (1939).
38. Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 48 (statement of David Schenker).
39. H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1939). In particular, the SEC study
discussed the following potential areas of abuse:
(a) The conflict of fiduciary obligations owed to corporation and client when an
adviser is a corporate director of a corporation held in the portfolio of the
adviser's client.
(b) The affiliation of investment advisers with brokerage firms, because it may
result in irreconcilable conflicts since the broker makes his commission on
sales and thus has an interest in high turnover.
(c) The trading by investment advisers for their own account in the same securi-
ties in which the client has an interest.
(d) The use of percentage of profits as a means of compensating the investment
adviser, because it may encourage the adviser to recommend a degree of risk
that the investor himself would not knowingly undertake since the adviser
has everything to gain if he is successful and little to lose if he is not.
(e) The adviser maintaining custody of his client's funds and the potential risk
of the adviser's use of these funds to avoid his own insolvency.
(0 The assignment of control of the client's funds to another individual or firm
without the knowledge or consent of the client. Id at 29-30.
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ied, it seems apparent that the original working assumption of
Congress in passing the Advisers Act was that the adviser would
render disinterested investment advice concerning securities to an
advisee-firm in which the adviser was neither an investor nor a
full-time, salaried employee-manager but in whose performance
the adviser did have a potentially conflicting pecuniary interest
requiring regulation.40  This working assumption was expressly
recognized by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc.,41 when it noted that the Advisers Act "reflects
a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment ad-
viser- consciously or unconsciously-to render advice which was
not disinterested."'42 Furthermore, it seems evident from various
legislative materials that Congress viewed investment advisers as
separate, independent professionals who provide counsel to unre-
lated investors.43
The Advisers Act was originally characterized by both the
SEC' and Congress45 as "a simple form of registration" intended
merely to screen out persons considered inappropriate for the pro-
fession. However, industry representatives unanimously recog-
nized from the outset that the proposed bill went far beyond
simple registration requirements.46 For example, Rudolf Berle,
40. Consider the specific abuses discussed in paragraphs (c) and (d) id In paragraph
(c), it was considered a potential abuse if the securities held by adviser and client were not
mutually exclusive. The "heads I win, tails you lose" profit-sharing abuses described in
paragraph (d), which eventually were addressed by § 205(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-5(l) (1976), also reflect a concern that loses its force if the adviser and client have
both committed funds to the investment.
41. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
42. Id at 191-92 (emphasis added).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1940) (general statements accompanying the reports of the finalized bill
to both the House and Senate). See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 191 (1963).
44. David Schenker, chief counsel of the SEC's Investment Trust and Investment
Companies Study, testified that the bill attempts "to see if we could not get something
which approximated a compulsory census. Fundamentally, that is the basic approach of
Title II [Advisers Act]." Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 48. Judge Robert E. Healy,
then an SEC Commissioner, stated that "the real intent of Title II is to see to it that men
with [criminal records] cannot go into the business of being investment advisers." Senate
Hearings, supra note 36, at 757.
45. Senator Wagner, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee that held hearings on the
Advisers Act, stated that the Act required "a simple form of registration of some kind to
the end that we do not put a man who is just out ofjail in that work [investment adviser], or
somebody who has been engaging in all kinds of practices and has been enjoined." Senate
Hearings, supra note 36, at 746.
46. See Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 711-58. Nearly all of the industry spokes-
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General Counsel to the Investment Counsellors Association of
America, criticized the section 202(a)(1 1) definition of investment
adviser as being overly broad and so vague that one could not tell
who was to be included within its scope.47 Presumably, Congress
adopted such an all-inclusive definition to allow it to be adapted
to then unforeseen investment advisory contexts.48
Reflecting the primary concern of Congress, the bulk of the
Advisers Act focuses on the compulsory census of advisers. This
is accomplished by the detailed registration and reporting require-
ments contained in sections 203 and 204. In light of the sparse
legislative discussion of conflict of interest problems, 49 it is not
surprising that relatively few provisions of the Advisers Act deal
with these issues.5° The informational and noninformational reg-
ulations5 itemized in sections 205 through 208 seem to be stop-
gap measures addressed to the specific abuses of the "investment
counsel fringe" uncovered in the SEC's study of investment advis-
ers. The statutory regulations and authorization for agency rules
are designed to preserve "the delicate fiduciary nature of an in-
men testifying at the congressional hearings represented major investment counsel firms,
which for the most part acted almost exclusively as advisers to investment companies, in-
surance companies, or other large corporate investors. By the admission of the chief coun-
sel of the Investment Trust and Investment Companies Study, the final draft of the
Advisers Act was written by one of these industry spokesmen. Id at 1124 (statement of
David Schenker). Until amended in 1970, the Advisers Act exempted from registration
any investment adviser whose only clients were investment companies and insurance com-
panies. This exemption was added to the final bill adopted after the Senate hearings, pre-
sumably by the industry representative who wrote the final draft. Compare S. 3580, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. § 204(b) (1940) with the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686,
§ 203(b)(2), 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(2) (1976)). This
apparently little-known, and completely undiscussed, addition to the registration exemp-
tions effected a significant change in the coverage of the Advisers Act and may explain the
industry's about-face endorsement of the bill. In 1970, the investment company client ex-
emption was deleted. Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547,
§ 24(a), 84 Stat. 1413 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1970)).
47. Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 748.
48. The definition criticized by Mr. Berle was adopted virtually intact. Compare S.
3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. §45(a)(16) with Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(a)(I 1) (1976).
49. See Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 320.
50. See note 39 supra.
51. A "noninformational" securities regulation, as that term is used by Professor Ron-
ald J. Coffey, is one which "prohibits a course of conduct even assuming, and notwith-
standing, the exertion of maximum efforts to prevent information failure in connection
with such conduct." R. Coffey, Securities Regulation Policy & Analysis 581a (1978) (un-
published multilith, Case Western Reserve University School of Law). This contrasts with
a disclosure regulation which is primarily "informational." See Coffey, Book Review, 124
U. PA. L. Rnv. 268, 278-79 (1975).
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vestment advisory relationship."52 Perhaps because the legislative
history is so sparse, the fabric of the adviser's fiduciary duty has
been much more substantially developed by the SEC53 pursuant
to its broad definitional and rulemaking powers under section 206.
Development of the adviser's fiduciary duty, however, has not al-
tered the Advisers Act's original view of the adviser as an in-
dependent professional, counseling or acting on behalf of a client
in a context not addressed, or not adequately addressed, by tradi-
tional business association law. In other words, the Act directly
contemplated an adviser rendering securities advice other than in
the context of irrevocable discretionary management prerogatives
invested in him as manager generally of all the affairs of a firm.
It should not be concluded, however, that general partners are
not investment advisers within the meaning of the Advisers Act
merely because the original congressional enactment failed to dis-
cuss the type of business relationship found in limited partner-
ships. The popular use of the limited partnership form for
investment and tax shelter purposes is a relatively recent phenom-
enon, occurring for the most part after World War II. It may well
be that Congress merely overlooked limited partnerships. In or-
der to understand how the Advisers Act applies to general part-
ners, it is necessary to explore the nature of the protections
Congress sought to provide in adopting both the Advisers Act and
its companion enactment, the Investment Company Act (the
Company Act). 4 Specifically, this Note will examine the distinc-
tive regulations developed by these two statutes for investment ad-
visers on one hand and internal business managers on the other.
C. Business Manager vs. Investment Adviser
The drafters of the Advisers Act sought to provide protection
for the securities investor in an adviser-client relationship. Al-
though there was little indication of an intent by Congress to regu-
late business association law internal managers55 by calling them
investment advisers, the possibility of such regulation arises in all
52. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961).
53. The SEC's development of the antifraud provisions in §§ 205 and 206 may be
classified in three categories: conduct involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure, con-
duct not involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure that is nevertheless fraudulent or
deceptive, and conduct involving adviser-client fee arrangements. See Note, supra note 17,
at 325-30 & 326-30 nn.108-35.
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52 (1976).
55. The term "business association law internal managers" is used here to describe
those persons who are given discretionary management prerogatives by virtue of business
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business firm contexts, including the corporate form. To the ex-
tent Congress chose to regulate internal managers, it most clearly
did so in the Company Act.
The Company Act is, for the most part, a general corporate
statute which regulates capital structure, management qualifica-
tions and functions, management transactions, participation of
shareholders, financial accounting, and disclosure duties of com-
panies that engage primarily in the business of investing and rein-
vesting in securities of other companies. 6 The Company Act, like
the Advisers Act, performs a crude occupational licensing func-
tion by providing for the registration of officers, directors, part-
ners, and investment advisers of investment trusts and
companies. 7 Notably, however, the Company Act also provides
for substantial regulation of investment advisers,58 contrasting in
coverage and specificity with the few conflict of interest prohibi-
tions found expressly in the Advisers Act.5 9
The Company Act specifically excludes from its definition of
investment adviser any "bona fide officer, director, trustee, mem-
ber of an advisory board, or employee of such [registered invest-
ment] company, as such .... ,,60 The original Company Act bill,
association law and who are exercising these prerogatives on a full-time basis without any
special compensation for advice as to securities held in the firm's portfolio.
56. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIs REGULATION 144-53 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969).
57. Company Act § 8(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(4) (1976); Sf. id § 9(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-9(a) (setting forth disqualifying characteristics of potential investment company per-
sonnel).
58. The Company Act significantly differs from the Advisers Act in its definition of
investment adviser. See notes 60-63 infra and accompanying text.
59. Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (1976), see note 14 supra,
addresses, from an informational point of view, certain potential adviser conflict of interest
matters in the highly distilled form of securities purchases and sales. As previously noted,
see notes 8 and 40 supra, § 205(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(l) (1976), and the proviso thereto
also explicitly regulate adviser-advisee compensation arrangements- contractual relation-
ships in a setting where conflict of interest is a factor. On the other hand, §§ 205(2) and (3),
id §§ 80b-5(2) to -5(3), merely personalize the contractual duty of the adviser to the ad-
visee; §§ 206(1), (2), and (4), id §§ 80b-6(l) to -6(2), -6(4), are general antideception
prohibitions.
By contrast, §§ 15(a) and (c) of the Company Act, id §§ 80a-15(a), -15(c), specifically
regulate, in an expressly organizational setting, the threshold procedural conditions under
which an advisory contract can come into being; § 36(b), id § 80a-35(b), imposes a "fiduci-
ary duty" upon the adviser enforceable by the SEC or the investment company sharehold-
ers; and § 17(i), id 80a-17(i), prohibits waiver of contractual liability for high degrees of
misconduct, beyond the prohibition against waiver of the statute's effect found in § 47, id §
80a-46. For further instances in which the Company Act regulates potential conflict of
interest matters, see §§ 10, 15, 17, 21, 25, id §§ 80a-10, -15, -17, -21, -25.
60. Company Act § 2(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (1976).
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however, contained a definition of investment adviser6 identical
to that used in section 202(a)(1 1) of the Advisers Act that makes
no reference to investment company officers and directors. Never-
theless, the final draft of the bill that was passed by Congress spe-
cifically excluded officers, directors, and other management
employees acting as such from investment adviser status under the
Company Act,62 while retaining the original definition for the Ad-
visers Act.63 A general partner of an investment partnership is
analogous to a director of a corporate investment company and, in
fact, meets the statutory definition of director in the Company
Act.64
There are a number of possible interpretations of Congress'
specific exclusion of officers, directors, and others acting as such
from the definition of investment adviser in the Company Act and
its failure to mention the regulation of internal managers, as such,
in the Advisers Act. The separate treatment of advisers and man-
agers perhaps indicates a reluctance by Congress to encroach
upon management behavior to the extent that it takes place within
the framework of the exercise of discretionary management pre-
rogatives given by business association law, and clearly subject to
its sanctions thereunder. This reluctance would be greatest where
those prerogatives are exercised by those who devote most of their
time to carrying out their business association law responsibilities.
Note that whenever the Company Act wishes to encroach by way
of regulation of internal managers acting as such, it does so under
labels other than "investment adviser." Instead, the statute speaks
to "officers, directors, or affiliates."65
The unwillingness of Congress to provide that regulation ap-
plicable to investment advisers is applicable as well to internal
managers acting as such on a full-time basis without special com-
pensation for securities advice conceivably derives from the view
that the beneficial owners of a particular enterprise have handed
61. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 45(a)(16) (1940).
62. Company Act § 2(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (1976).
63. Advisers Act § 202(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (1976).
64. Section 2(a)(12), id § 80a-2(a)(12) (1976), defines "director" to include persons
"performing similar functions" to that of a director, in the case ofnoncorporate entities. In
considering registration of partnerships under the Company Act, the staff of the SEC has
consistently regarded general partners of limited partnerships as directors within the mean-
ing of the statutory definition. E.g., Brian A. Pecker, SEC no-action letter (Oct. 3, 1974),
reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,997; Carolina Pal-
metto Income Investors, SEC no-action letter (Feb. 22, 1974).
65. Eg., Company Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1976).
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over discretionary management clearly and irrevocably to such in-
ternal managers.66 Congress may have implicitly recognized that
business association law constraints upon discretionary managers
may be sufficient in those areas in which Congress chose to regu-
late only investment advisers and not internal managers. Business
association law controls for discretionary managers may have
been judged sufficient: (1) when they are clearly applicable, that
is, when one is considering persons who clearly possess discretion-
ary management prerogatives under state business association law
and who, therefore, are clearly subject to duties arising from state
law; (2) when the discretionary manager devotes most, if not all,
of his time to carrying out his management function and furnish-
ing particularized advisory services, thus assuring a certain level
of diligence; and (3) when the discretionary manager is not sepa-
rately paid, especially through a contingency arrangement, for the
securities advisory aspect of his management function, a contrac-
tual arrangement which could create a conflict between his overall
objectives as manager and his objectives as a securities adviser.
In circumstances where Congress chose to regulate discretion-
ary managers even when the above conditions are met, it did so
only in the Company Act, and then only under labels other than
"investment adviser."
Other possible interpretations of Congress' intent may be
drawn from the different definitions of investment adviser con-
tained in the two acts, and specifically from the fact that the Ad-
visers Act definition does not expressly exclude internal managers,
as does the Company Act definition.67 An expressio unius est ex-
clusio aiterius argument might lead to the conclusion that Con-
gress, by not specifically excluding internal managers from the
Advisers Act definition, intended to include them. This argument
gains further force if one assumes that Congress intended to leave
no "gaps" in the regulation of internal managers of investment
companies. Such a gap might exist because the various Company
Act regulations of internal managers apply only to managers of
registered investment companies.68 Because there are many ex-
66. If this is the rationale, then it is even more directly applicable in the limited part-
nership context than in the corporate situation since limited partners hand over manage-
ment to general partners to a greater extent than shareholders. See Gabinet and Coffey,
The Implications of the Economic Concept of Income for Corporation-Shareholder Income
Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 895, 901-03 n.29, 909 (1977).
67. Compare Advisers Act § 202(a)(I 1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (1976) with Com-
pany Act § 2(a)(20), id § 80a-2(a)(20) (1976).
68. E.g., Company Act § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (1976) (stating that certain per-
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emptions from registration as an investment company,69 the inter-
nal managers of many investment companies would be outside the
scope of the Company Act. This is of particular relevance here
because the vast majority of limited partnerships that would
otherwise often qualify as investment companies are not regis-
tered as investment companies because they tailor their structure
to fall within one of the specific exemptions.70 Thus, the Commis-
sion has argued that the Advisers Act steps in to fill the unwanted
regulatory gap that exists for the internal managers of unregis-
tered investment companies.7
This explanation of Congress' exclusion of internal managers
from the definition of investment advisers in the Company Act
does not seem compelling. On the most superficial level, it can be
said that the Company Act, which regulates investment vehicles in
clear coordination with those vehicles' enabling business associa-
tion law, is more applicable to the limited partnership context
than is the Advisers Act, which is essentially a rough attempt at
occupational licensing. In terms of statutory construction, the spe-
cific should control the general,72 and it is clear that Congress spe-
cifically and precisely dealt with investment vehicles and their
internal managers in the Company Act. It would be a great inter-
pretive leap to suppose that internal managers of unregistered in-
vestment companies were intended to be covered by the Advisers
Act because their employers, still regulated to the same extent by
business association law, are exempted from Company Act regu-
lation. Rather, it would seem that Congress, having excluded in-
ternal managers from adviser status in the Company Act, never
considered it necessary to also exclude them from the Advisers
Act, since it was only the Company Act that was meant to apply to
internal managers. That is, since the Company Act, unlike the
sons are ineligible to serve as internal managers of registered investment companies); id
§ 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976) (authorizing civil actions by the Commission for breach of
fiduciary duty by internal managers of registered investment companies).
69. Company Act §§ 3(b), 3(c), 6, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(b), -3(c), -6 (1976).
70. Limited partnerships can fall within the § 3(c)(l) exemption from registration as
investment companies when they are beneficially owned by fewer than 100 persons and
they do not mak a public offering of their securities. 15 U S.C. § 80a-3(c)(l) (1976). See
note 29 supra.
71. Supplemental Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae
at 14-16, Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as SEC's
Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief). See also Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 41-52,
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977).
72. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.05 (4th
ed. C. Sands 1973).
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Advisers Act, deals so comprehensively with the internal opera-
tions of the recipient of the advisory services, it was presumably
only with respect to the Company Act, and not the Advisers Act,
that Congress considered that the term "adviser" might be taken
in all cases to include internal managers, unless Congress took the
trouble, as it did, to provide that "adviser" does not include inter-
nal managers acting as such and that such managers will be ad-
dressed, when necessary, by other terms.
There is an additional basis for concluding that Congress did
not intend that full-time internal managers of federally regulated
or unregulated investment companies or any other firms that
might have securities in their portfolios should be considered in-
vestment advisers. Lawyers, accountants, engineers, and teachers
are excluded from adviser status in the Adviser Act when their
"performance of such [advisory] services is solely incidental to the
practice of [their] profession. '7 3 Brokers and dealers are excluded
when their advisory services are "incidental" and when they "re-
ceive no special compensation therefor."74 The bases for these
two exclusions are that such individuals' advisory services are cus-
tomarily incidental to their profession and that they usually re-
ceive no special compensation for such advice. A similar rationale
also underlies the exclusion of most business association law inter-
nal managers from advisory status. These internal managers per-
form numerous managerial functions which, for the most part, are
unrelated to securities advice." In addition, their compensation
package may be wholly undifferentiated between compensation
for securities advice, if any, and that for their other managerial
services. Congress may well have recognized that in most internal
manager situations, it would be administratively impossible to de-
termine which persons were being specially compensated for in-
vestment advice. In short, the very criteria which exclude lawyers,
accountants, and brokers and dealers from investment adviser sta-
tus may exclude most business association law internal managers
even more convincingly.
There is one final theoretical observation which renders the
section 202(a)(1 1) definition of investment adviser inapplicable to
many business association law internal managers and particularly
73. Advisers Act § 202(a)(I I)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1)(B) (1976).
74. Id § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1)(C) (1976).
75. Advice is used here in its broadest sense to include both informational consulta-
tion as well as managerial discretion over securities accounts. See Abrahamson v. Flesch-
ner, 568 F.2d 862, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
[Vol. 29:634
INVESTMENT AD VISERS A CT
general partners of limited partnerships. If the "entity" concept of
firms is to be accepted, a particularly strong argument can be
made that the limited partnership entity is separate and distinct
from the limited partnership investors.7 6 Hence, if the general
partner is deemed to be advising anyone, it would be the "entity"
and not the limited partners. But the general partner, as one fully
in control of day-to-day management, "is" this separate partner-
ship entity as far as decisionmaking is concerned. In this regard,
then, his posture is comparable to that of the corporate officer and
director who stand within the corporate entity with a role distin-
guishable from that of the shareholders. When the internal man-
ager has complete and irrevocable managerial discretion with
regard to securities in the business' portfolio, how can it concep-
tually be argued that the manager is advising "others" as the sec-
tion 202(a)(1 1) definition requires?77
This type of conceptual difficulty was raised and resolved soon
after the adoption of the Advisers Act in In the Matter ofAugustus
P. Loring.78 In discussing the application of the section 202(a)(1 1)
definition to a legal trustee, the Commission 9 stated:
Applicant's services under these appointments are not limited
to supervision of investments but include all other services or-
dinarily incident to the ownership and management of prop-
erty. Likewise, when applicant acts with regard to real property
whether under court appointment or under an indenture, he
acts asprincpal. Title to the real property is in his name, and
his duties include all services ordinarily incident to ownership
and management of such property. Where the applicant acts
under power of attorney, he has full control over the property
in question and performs duties substantially similar to those
performed as trustee. It is important to note that applicant's
activities under the powers of attorney constitute only a minor
part of his business and are, in effect, incidental to his business
of acting as trustee.80
A much later district court decision in Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda
Ltd 8 followed this line of reasoning by holding that a "trustee
76. See Gabinet & Coffey, supra note 66, at 929-30.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (1976); see Petitioners' Reply Brief at 8-9, Fleschner v.
Abrahamson, 436 U.S. 913 (1978), denying cert. to 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977).
78. 11 S.E.C. 885 (1942).
79. This decision was rendered by a Commission that included Robert E. Healy, the
Commissioner who had overall supervision of the SEC's Study of Investment Trusts and
Investment Companies and who testified at length before Congress during its discussions of
the Company and Advisers Acts. See Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 52.
80. 11 S.E.C. at 887 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
81. 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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does not advise the trust corpus, which then takes action pursuant
to his advice; rather the trustee acts himself as principal. 8 2 Al-
though the staff of the Commission currently seeks to limit the
effect of these decisions to their specific factual circumstances, 3
the decisions remain as the only authority of precedential value on
this precise issue.
The same conceptual problem that the Commission and court
recognized with regard to trustees, that is, that when they act, they
give advice (informational or managerial) to themselves and not
to "others," is applicable to business association law internal man-
agers who have irrevocable, discretionary day-to-day control. The
Commission staff has concurred with this analysis in a recent no-
action letter in which a bona fide director of an investment com-
pany was deemed not to be an investment adviser for purposes of
either the Company Act or the Advisers Act.8 4 The staff stated
that "such a director rendering investment advisory services in his
capacity as director generally would not be. . .deemed to be en-
gaged in the business of advising others."" 5 If a bona fide internal
manager acts in the exercise of broad discretion that is absolutely
irrevocable, it is difficult to see how he can be advising anyone but
himself. That is, it is difficult to find an advisee separate and dis-
tinct from the adviser.8
6
The conceptual similarity of these various business association
law internal managers and others functioning in a relationship
with discretion granted subject to existing legal control-including
general partners of limited partnerships, trustees of trusts, admin-
istrators of estates and pension plans, and investment officers of
corporate investors- demonstrates that any wholesale inclusion
of this group within the scope of the Advisers Act definition of
investment adviser would be untenable. It seems unreasonable to
suggest that this group constitutes an unregulated gap that the Ad-
82. Id at 420.
83. See SEC's Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 71, at 9-13.
84. Cornelius A. Rose Associates, Inc., SEC no-action letter (June 2, 1978), reprinted
in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,639.
85. Id (emphasis added).
86. One anomaly may be the situation in which a discretionary decisionmaker for an
indipidual in a simple agency relationship, without the overlay of trust, partnership, or
corporation law, would almost always be called an adviser, no matter how broad his man-
agement discretion. In the case of a person making decisions for an individual, however, it
would be rare for the decisionmaking power, although broadly discretionary--granting the
right not only to choose securities to buy, sell, or hold, but also to execute securities trans-
actions - to be irrevocable in the strict sense, even where the individual client might be
subject to a breach of contract action for damages if he exercised his power to revoke.
[Vol. 29:634
INVESTMENT ADVISERS4 CT
visers Act could conveniently close. Such a function of the Advis-
ers Act was never contemplated during the legislative hearings.
Furthermore, the unregulated gap is metaphorically closer to a
chasm, and it seems inconceivable that such a broad scale landfill
was intended to be accomplished by a flexible application of the
rather simply conceived Advisers Act.
The exclusion of many business association law internal man-
agers from investment adviser status does not seem to be the result
of oversight. Rather, the exclusion seems to have been intention-
ally based upon elements of internality and externality with re-
spect to the legal relationships established by existing business
association law. These elements include the degree to which in-
vestment advice is merely "incidental" to other managerial func-
tions, whether the manager is being specially compensated for his
advisory services, and the degree to which the manager is advising
only himself and not "others." For analytical purposes, these ele-
ments may be viewed as separate continua, against which one can
measure the relationship of specific business managers to their en-
terprises. Although the present discussion focuses upon general
partners of limited partnerships, this construct can measure the
advisory characteristics of any business manager.
II. APPLICATION OF INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CRITERIA
The three criteria of externality may be applied to specific lim-
ited partnership contexts to determine the extent of the advisory
characteristics possessed by an individual general partner on a
continuum of possible configurations. These criteria and their re-
spective theoretical extremes can be illustrated by the following
continua indicating a "nonadviser" characteristic on the left and
an "adviser" characteristic on the right.
A. Nature of the limited partnership's underlying asset project
as defined by the degree to which its portfolio contains
securities.
No securities in partnership
asset portfolio (only security Portfolio contains securities.
involved is the limited partner-
ship interest itself).
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B. Nature of the management function of the general partner,
that is, whether he handles, alone or with others, all the
affairs of the limited partnership.
General partner is a full-time General partner performs mini-
manager of a single limited mal managerial functions for a
partnership, giving tailored number of partnerships he has
attention to all affairs, including actively "structured" and pro-
securities advisory services, to vides stereotyped (te., not tai-
the firm. lored) securities management. 87
C. Nature of the compensation arrangement between the general
partner and the limited partnership.
General partner receives spe-
General partner receives undif- cial, differentiated compensa-
ferentiated compensation for tion for his advice regarding
the aggregate of managerial securities and that compensa-
services he performs. tion varies with his perform-
ance.
In applying these continua, an initial determination must be
made with respect to the nature of the underlying asset project.
Unless there is involvement with securities, the Advisers Act will
not apply since the statute is, after all, only a form of securities
regulation. If there is an involvement with securities, the focus
will shift to the degree of externality of the general partner's man-
agerial function and form of compensation, as reflected on con-
tinua B and C. The basic premise of this analysis is that a purely
internal manager of a limited partnership should not be consid-
ered an investment adviser within the meaning of the Advisers
Act. The Commission has implicitly recognized this position."8
On the other hand, a general partner may in some circumstances
possess external characteristics sufficient to qualify him for inclu-
sion within the coverage of the Advisers Act. The various con-
tinua, and current position of the Commission with respect to
each, will be considered in turn.
A. Nature of the Limited Partnershp's Underlying Asset Project
The significance of a limited partnership's involvement with
securities in its asset project may be misperceived. Of course,
there must be a threshold involvement with securities in order to
trigger any federal securities regulation. It is the contention of this
Note, however, that in the investment adviser context, no amount
of securities involvement with the limited partnership's underlying
asset project should, without more, result in classification of its
87. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
88. Hydrocarbon Resources, Ltd., SEC no-action letter (Feb. 29, 1975).
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general partner as an investment adviser. So long as the general
partner is a bona fide internal business manager acting as such in
a full-time capacity and without special compensation for securi-
ties advice, then the limited partnership's nature as a securities
investment vehicle should be irrelevant. Nevertheless, the under-
lying asset project's involvement with securities is discussed here
for two reasons. First, the SEC has, to date, looked to the under-
lying asset project's involvement with securities as one determi-
nant of a general partner's Advisers Act status.89 Second,
although the degree of securities involvement is not dispositive of
the general partner's classification as an adviser, there may be a
purely descriptive effect in the sense that the firm's increased in-
terest in securities may increase the likelihood that the general
partner will not conduct himself as a bona fide internal manager
and may demonstrate some advisory characteristics.
The position of the SEC is that under the federal securities
laws an offering of limited partnership interests generally consti-
tutes an offering of a profit-sharing agreement or an investment
contract, 90 which is a "security" within the meaning of section 2(1)
of the Securities Act of 1933.91 Often the interest in the limited
partnership will be the only security with which the general part-
ner will have to deal in connection with his management duties.
When this is the case, as for example when the limited partnership
"portfolio" contains "only . . .whole works of art," 92 it becomes
less tenable that a general partner be considered engaged in the
business of advising others with regard to securities. Even so, a
prominent member of the Commission staff has privately ex-
pressed the view that the general partner's advice to prospective
limited partners with respect to the advisability of investing in his
limited partnership's interests is, of itself, sufficient to place the
89. See notes 95-106 infra and accompanying text.
90. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877 (Aug. 8, 1967), reprinted in 1 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1046.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976).
92. The Consartium Fund, SEC no-action letter (Sept. 3, 1975). It is important to
note, however, that ownership of tangible assets may still be considered an investment in
securities, such as when the discretion to buy and sell the partnership's assets is given to an
external adviser who simultaneously manages these assets together with the assets of other
persons or entities as part of a common enterprise. See Thomas Beard, SEC no-action
letter (May 8, 1975), reprinted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,141; CoinVest, SEC no-action letter (June 10, 1974), reprinted in [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,823. This is an important concept because the port-
folios of many limited partnerships might not seem, at first glance, to contain securities,
when in fact they do.
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general partner within the Advisers Act definition.9 3 However,
neither the Commission nor this staff member9 4 has ever officially
taken this position.
The Commission's difficulty in arriving at a consistent position
in this area is well illustrated by its public response to two inquir-
ies regarding limited partnerships formed to invest in commodity
future contracts. 95 The SEC has consistently held that commodi-
ties and commodity future contracts are not securities. 96 How-
ever, when first queried as to the adviser status of a general
partner of a limited partnership formed solely for the purpose of
commodities trading, the staff recommended registration under
the Advisers Act.9 7 Applying the criteria developed for external
advisers to commodities investors, the staff concluded that regis-
tration would be necessary because the general partner would be
giving advice to the limited partners with respect to securities in
the sense that the limited partners would not be purchasing direct
ownership of commodity future contracts and there would be an
investment in a common enterprise.98 With reasoning that did not
entirely follow, the staff then concluded that "if the general part-
ner solicited persons to invest in the limited partnership, he would
appear to be rendering advice as to investing in securities (i.e.,
93. See Lybecker, Advisers Act Developments, 8 REv. SEc. REo. 927, 928 (1975).
94. See Hydrocarbon Resources, Ltd., SEC no-action letter (Feb. 29, 1975) (letter
written by Martin Lybecker, SEC staff attorney).
95. Compare Thomas Beard, SEC no-action letter (May 8, 1975), reprinted in
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,141 with Michael Coleman &
Lawrence Grenon, SEC no-action letter (July 28, 1976).
96. E.g., Robert Enright, SEC no-action letter (Feb. 2, 1974), reprinted in [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,671; Oklahoma Commodity Fund, SEC
no-action letter (Feb. 12, 1971), reprinted in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 78,058.
In the Robert Enright letter the staff said that external advisers to commodity invest-
ment firms who advise such firms with regard to commodities and commodities futures will
not fall within the Advisers Act so long as
1) each client purchases direct ownership of commodity futures contracts upon
his own decision and in reliance solely on the speculative hope that the mar-
ket price of the underlying commodities will vary in his favor and there is no
investment in a common enterprise with others;
2) clients are not advised concerning commodity option contracts; and
3) clients receive no advice concerning conventional securities, including advice
as to the relative desirability of investing in commodities as compared to con-
ventional securities.
(emphasis in original).
97. Thomas Beard, SEC no-action letter (May 8, 1975), reprinted in [1977-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,141.
98. Id
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interests in the limited partnership)." 99 This overinclusive defini-
tion of advice with respect to securities, which would have in-
cluded all general partners who form limited partnerships
regardless of the underlying asset projects involved, was quickly
withdrawn. The staff expressly reconsidered these views in a sub-
sequent no-action request presenting a similar factual situation. I°
The staff concluded that a general partner of a limited partnership
investing solely in commodity futures would not be required to
register so long as he would not be selling interests in more than
one limited partnership at any one time.10'
Two assumptions are implicit in this reconsideration. First,
the staff recognized that advice to prospective limited partners re-
garding the purchase of an interest in a limited partnership is,
without more, insufficient to qualify the general partner as a per-
son "engaged in the business of advising others" with respect to
securities. According to this analysis, in order for the Advisers
Act to apply, the general partner must be continuously involved in
the formation and promotion of limited partnerships. In such a
situation, it could plausibly be said that the general partner was in
the business of advising prospective limited partners as to the de-
sirability of investing in limited partnership securities. This dis-
tinction between continuous and incidental promotion of
partnership interests apparently captures the current position of
the staff.102
This position is consistent with the internal-external analysis
developed above. When the general partner is continuously sell-
ing partnership interests, he is advising prospective limited part-
ners,10 3 without regard to their ultimate status as actual limited
partners, and is not acting as the internal manager of the partner-
ship entity. This leads to the second assumption implicit in the
reconsideration of the initial overinclusive criteria. In its initial
consideration of the issue the SEC staff focused on the limited
partner's lack of direct ownership of the commodity futures and
99. Id
100. Michael Coleman & Lawrence Grenon, SEC no-action letter (July 28, 1976).
101. Id
102. See Hydrocarbon Resources, Ltd., SEC no-action letter (Feb. 29, 1975).
103. It may be argued that even in this situation the general partner is not acting as the
prototypical investment adviser envisaged by the framers of the Advisers Act. Unlike the
prototypical adviser whose function is to provide disinterested investment advice with re-
spect to the relative desirability of a broad range of investment opportunities, the general
partner would be primarily advocating only his own investment. In this regard, he is much
more akin to an issuer than an investment adviser.
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his investment in a common enterprise as being a "security" with
regard to which the general partner was deemed to be giving ad-
vice. 0 4 In its reconsideration, the staff implicitly shifted its focus
from indirect ownership by the limited partner to the direct own-
ership by the partnership entity. Thus, the reconsidered position
of the SEC staff focuses not only on the regularity of the general
partner's promotion of limited partnership interests but also on
the venture's involvement in securities in its asset pool. This is
significant since otherwise even a non-securities investment by the
limited partnership could be viewed as a form of indirect owner-
ship or an investment in a common enterprise (the partnership
itself), giving rise to securities advice by the general partner. In
light of the staff's consistent failure to characterize as investment
advisers those general partners of limited partnerships not invest-
ing in securities, it seems clear that the Commission has chosen
not to go this far.'0 5 However, the degree of scrutiny involved
increases when the underlying asset project of the limited partner-
ship involves securities. This often involves a threshold issue of
what constitutes a security with such a determination resting upon
the facts of each investment situation.
10 6
Despite the importance which the SEC places on the limited
partnership's degree of securities involvement, the policies and in-
tended coverage underlying the protections provided in the Advis-
ers Act and Company Act seem to indicate that the focus of the
inquiry should more properly be directed to an examination of the
general partner's status as a bona fide business manager. The two
primary components of this status will now be examined.
B. Nature of the Management Function of the General Partner
As discussed above, 10 7 a general partner engaged full time in
the broad range of managerial functions of a single limited part-
nership is closely analogous to a corporate officer having irrevoca-
ble discretion and management obligations under business
association law for the day-to-day affairs of the corporation. Un-
less the general partner exhibits some external characteristics not
contemplated by business association law, it does not seem justifi-
104. Thomas Beard, SEC no-action letter (May 8, 1975), reprinted in [1977-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,141.
105. See, e.g., Michael Coleman & Lawrence Grenon, SEC no-action letter (July 28,
1976); The Consartium Fund, SEC no-action letter (Sept. 3, 1975).
106. See Coffey, supra note 27.
107. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
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able that he should be included within that class of persons in-
tended to be specially regulated by the Advisers Act. In the
context of the manager's entrepreneurial function, external char-
acteristics suggesting adviser status can be said to exist when the
general partner's involvement with securities advice is more than
incidental to his function as a bona fide business association law
internal manager. The best example of this occurs when the gen-
eral partner of a non-securities-related partnership is continuously
involved in the formation of other limited partnerships. In this
situation his investment advice to prospective limited partners
may be more than incidental to his internal manager functions.
His activities will not be that of a full-time internal manager, con-
stantly subject to a duty of diligence and loyalty imposed by busi-
ness association law with respect to one firm. Rather, it might be
more properly said that he is "engaged in the business" of advis-
ing others with respect to securities.
The staff essentially recognized this position in a no-action let-
ter which concluded that adviser status was inapplicable to gen-
eral partners of a limited partnership formed for the sole purpose
of effecting a corporate takeover. 10 8 Although the staff felt the
general partners' activities in soliciting limited partners did fall
within the definition of an investment adviser, when their activi-
ties were considered as a whole the staff concluded that the gen-
eral partners were not "'in the business' of advising others; rather
their advisory activities [could] be considered to be a minor pro-
portion of their general activity as general partners .... 109 In
view of their involvement with the sale of the partnership inter-
ests, the staff "reserve[d] the right to change [its] position if,
among other things, [the general partners] were continually form-
ing such limited partnerships or if they were otherwise engaged in
advisory activities." 10
Once the importance of external activity is acknowledged, the
question becomes how much external activity a general partner
may undertake before his advisory activities are not "solely inci-
dental" to his internal managerial function. The staff has implied
that adviser status in the non-securities-related limited partnership
context would not attach so long as the general partner would not
be selling interests in more than one partnership at any one
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time."' This should probably not be interpreted as meaning that
a general partner can avoid adviser status merely by making seria-
tim offerings of partnership interests. Rather, his advisory activity
must meet the "solely incidental" standard.
In the situation in which the general partner is selling partner-
ship interests on a recurring basis, it is important to consider, as a
related matter, whether his activities expose him to registration as
a "broker.""' 2 In determining whether a general partner is en-
gaged in the business of a securities broker, the staff tends to look
to the same tests it has developed for corporate officers, directors,
and employees who sell the corporation's securities." 13 Some of
the criteria for this test indicate elements of externality which may
cause a general partner to be deemed an adviser. Specifically, a
general partner's selling activities would not seem "solely inciden-
tal" to his managerial function if- (1) his management duties are
primarily limited to selling the partnership's interests; (2) his affili-
ation with the limited partnership essentially ends after all the in-
terests have been sold; (3) his compensation is closely tied to the
sale of the limited partnership interests. These marks of external-
ity reflect settings where business association law constraints on
internal managers-traditionally developed duties, standards of
diligence, and protections against conflicts of interest- do not ad-
equately protect investors. Thus, special federal regulation seems
warranted.
More difficult questions arise as to the general partner's ad-
viser status where the underlying portfolio of the limited partner-
ship contains securities. In this context the general partner may be
111. See Michael Coleman & Lawrence Grenon, SEC no-action letter (July 28, 1976).
112. A "broker" is defined as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transac-
tions in securities for the account of others ..... Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1976).
It should be noted that this situation also involves the general partner's crossing the
Advisers Act's definitional threshold, marking him as one who regularly "engages in the
business of advising others." Advisers Act § 202(a)(I 1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (1976).
For a discussion of the possible classification and consequences of classification of general
partners as brokers, see Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 9, at 326-34.
113. Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 9, note six factors applied by the SEC staff, each
potentially sufficient by itself to establish broker status:
(1) if [the officer, director or employee] was hired specifically to sell the issuer's
securities; (2) if he performs no substantial duties for the issuer other than selling
the issuer's securities; (3) if his employment with the issuer will terminate after
completion of the offering of securities; (4) if he was previously employed as a
securities salesman; (5) if his compensation is in the form of commissions or fees





involved with securities advice on two levels and hence, it may be
more difficult to say that his advice is solely incidental to his man-
agerial function. First, any general partner who participates in the
formation of the limited partnership is involved with securities ad-
vice on one level, that of selling partnership interests. A second
level of advice would exist when the general partner is custom-
arily consulted or has decisionmaking responsibility with respect
to the securities in the underlying portfolio of the partnership.
This advice immediately raises the conceptual problem discussed
above"l4 that the general partner is not advising "others," but
rather is merely advising himself. Furthermore, the express inten-
tion of the Company Act to exclude this type of advice from the
definition of investment adviser'1 5 militates against a conclusion
that this second level securities advice should, without more, re-
sult in adviser status for the general partner. Here, the general
partner's managerial function may be analogous to that of the in-
vestment officer of the corporate investor, a category specifically
excluded from adviser status in the Company Act." 6 However,
when the general partner's function ceases to be analogous to that
of a bona fide officer of a specific corporate investor and appears
to resemble an independent contractor more than an employee, it
would seem that he could then appropriately be deemed an invest-
ment adviser. This could occur, for example, when the general
partner was specially compensated solely on the basis of the lim-
ited partnership's securities transactions.
The staff currently takes a very broad position with respect to
the inclusion of general partners as investment advisers in the se-
curities-related limited partnership context, '17 as evidenced by its
treatment of hedge funds. 8 In Abrahamson v. Fleschner, the
Commission argued and the Second Circuit adopted" 9 the view
that the general partners of a hedge fund type limited partnership
render investment advice when they decide, on a discretionary ba-
114. See notes 76-86 supra and accompanying text.
115. Company Act § 2(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (1976).
116. Id
117. See, e.g., Brian A. Pecker, SEC no-action letter (Oct. 3, 1974), reprinted in
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 179,997; Brief of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae at 9-12, Abrahamson v. Flescbner, 568 F.2d 862
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
118. SEC's Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 71, at 16-21. See Brian A.
Pecker, SEC no-action letter (Oct. 3, 1974), reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,997.
119. 568 F.2d 862, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
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sis, how to invest the limited partners' contributions in a portfolio
of securities. Only when the general partner's duties are restricted
to administrative management and do not include investment dis-
cretion has the staff stated that adviser status would not attach in a
securities-related limited partnership.1 2' However, the Abraham-
son court went so far as to say that monthly reports issued by
general partners to limited partners were sufficient investment ad-
vice to consider the general partners "'engage[d] in the business
of advising others' with respect to investments."' 12 1 At the portfo-
lio-management level of the general partner's securities activities,
then, the Commission and at least one influential court have ap-
peared to look solely at the limited partner's reliance on his man-
ager's investment discretion, without reference to the degree of
protection offered by state business association law.
It is the final contention of this Note that the Commission, in
adopting such a broad view, has not allowed for an appropriate
distinction between an external and a purely internal general part-
ner performing advisory services. The overinclusive categoriza-
tion of general partners as investment advisers in the securities-
related limited partnership context is further demonstrated by the
staff's treatment of the compensation for advisory services, an im-
portant index of externality.
C. Nature of the Compensation Arrangement Between the
General Partner and the Limited Partnership
The Advisers Act states that an investment adviser is one who
renders securities advice "for compensation."' 122  In the limited
partnership context, the staff has taken the position that reim-
bursement for expenses incurred in the formation of the firm
120. See Corbyn Associates, Inc., SEC no-action letter (June 20, 1977), reprinted in
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc L. REP. (CCH) 81,252. In this securities-related
limited partnership, the general partners, who formed the limited partnership, were not
required to register as advisers when they performed the following duties: arranging for
the limited partnership's legal and accounting services; issuing quarterly and annual
financial reports to the limited partners; transmitting tax information to the limited part-
ners; maintaining checking and brokerage accounts; and paying the necessary expenses
incurred by the limited partnership. Portfolio management was provided under contract
by an incorporated investment adviser of which the general partners of the partnership
were employees. See also, Gardner and Preston Moss, Inc., SEC no-action letter (Feb. 23,
1972), reprinted in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,638.
121. 568 F.2d at 870. The court reasoned that the monthly reports were relied upon
heavily by the limited partners in their decisions whether or not to withdraw their funds
from the investment pool.
122. Advisers Act § 202(a)(I 1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (1976).
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would meet the compensation requirements of the Act. 123 The re-
quired compensation has also been found when the general part-
ner receives some portion of the brokerage commissions generated
by a limited partnership's securities transactions. 24 In the hedge
fund context, if the general partner is paid a share of the profits in
excess of that to which he would be entitled based on his capital
contribution to the partnership, the excess is viewed as compensa-
tion for investment advisory services.' 25
The nature of the general partner's compensation can help to
determine whether or not he is a bona fide business association
law internal manager, properly excluded from the coverage of the
Advisers Act. In making this distinction, it is again useful to anal-
ogize to the broker-dealer exclusion from the Advisers Act's defi-
nition.126 In determining whether a broker or dealer has received
special compensation, the Commission's General Counsel has
stated that "[t]he essential distinction to be borne in mind in con-
sidering borderline cases. . . is the distinction between compen-
sation for advice itself and compensation for services of another
character to which advice is merely incidental."' 27 This same test
seems applicable in the limited partnership context. The compen-
sation aspect of internality/externality goes hand in hand with the
managerial function component discussed above. When the gen-
eral partner receives an undifferentiated form of compensation for
the totality of management functions he performs, he does not ap-
pear to be within the intent of the Advisers Act's definition. How-
ever, when he is specifically compensated for rendering securities
advice, and that compensation is differentiated from his compen-
123. E.g., John Terwilliger, SEC no-action letter (June 27, 1977); Hydrocarbon Re-
sources, Ltd., SEC no-action letter (Feb. 29, 1975); Mattco Equities, Inc., SEC no-action
letter (Jan. 15, 1972), reprinted in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
78,660.
124. John Terwilliger, SEC no-action letter (June 27, 1977).
125. Mastoff & Weiss, Personal Views ofSEC Staff Members, in PRACTICING LAW IN-
STITUTE, INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND "OFFSHORE" INVESTMENT FUNDS 363-64
(1969).
Of course, a general partner would face a conundrum if required to register because
§ 205(1) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(I) (1976), expressly prohibits any compen-
sation to registered advisers in the form of a share in profits or capital appreciation. See
notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text. See also Lybecker, supra note 93, at 930.
126. Advisers Act § 202(a)( 11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll)(C) (1976). A broker or
dealer is excluded from the definition of investment adviser when his "performance of such
services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and.. .[he]
receives no special compensation therefore." Id
127. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2 (Oct. 28, 1940), reprinted in 5 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 56,156 at 44,055-2.
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sation for other managerial services or, more acutely, when he
receives no other compensation because he performs no other
managerial functions, then he would presumably fall within the
Advisers Act's intended coverage.
The use of compensation arrangements as an index of exter-
nality can also be applied in the context of a non-securities-related
limited partnership. It seems clear that the general partner of a
single limited partnership, charged with total management re-
sponsibility, is not receiving a differentiated compensation for se-
curities advice. Even if he is reimbursed for expenses incurred in
forming the partnership, it may be said that his total compensa-
tion will be "for services of another character to which advice is
merely incidental." 28 However, when the general partner is con-
tinuously forming limited partnerships, his compensation for the
advice that is involved in the sale of limited partnership interests
to prospective limited partners will not be "merely incidental" to
his compensation for other managerial functions.
The same analysis can be applied in the securities-related lim-
ited partnership context. The initial inquiry is the characteriza-
tion of the general partner's managerial function, that is, whether
he is charged with the full range of management responsibilities
or whether his activities are solely related to the securities advice
entailed in portfolio management. Can he be characterized as a
bona fide business association law internal manager? One princi-
pal characteristic to be considered in this determination is whether
the general partner receives special compensation for his portfolio
investment advice. This situation may be indicated by compensa-
tion that is closely tied to the performance of the partnership's
portfolio or by commissions that derive from the limited partner-
ship's securities transactions, especially when the general partner
receives no compensation for his other management duties.
III. CONCLUSION
The definitional treatment of general partners as investment
advisers by the Second Circuit in Abrahamson and by the SEC in
its no-action letters does not discriminate adequately between
bona fide business association law internal managers and those
individuals who, while perhaps appearing to act as internal man-
agers, actually demonstrate characteristics which bring them
within the intended coverage of the Advisers Act. The Advisers
128. Id
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Act and the Company Act were companion enactments which
were intended to have different, though somewhat contiguous,
coverage. The Company Act's separately categorized treatment of
directors, officers, and other business managers as compared with
advisers is significant. It suggests that since directors are not ad-
visers under the Company Act when acting as bona fide directors,
so general partners, when acting in a similar capacity, should not
be advisers either. This logic applies equally to the intended cov-
erage of both acts.
The legislative history of the Company Act does indicate an
intention by Congress to encroach upon management behavior to
a limited extent, even to the extent that it takes place within the
framework of discretionary management prerogatives given and
controlled by business association law. However, whenever the
Company Act wishes to encroach by way of regulation of internal
managers acting as such, it does so by using labels other than "in-
vestment adviser" to name them. When putative internal manag-
ers are not in fact acting as such-that is, when they do not devote
themselves fully to their management function or when they are
specially compensated for their securities advice-then it seems
less plausible that they should be excluded from Advisers Act cov-
erage. In short, a director, acting as such, is not an adviser. Like-
wise, when a general partner acts in a comparable capacity, he is
not an adviser. However, when these individuals cannot be accu-
rately characterized as bona fide internal managers, they should
be given investment adviser status and exposed to the coverage of
the Advisers Act.
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